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Abstract Emotive-factive predicates, such as surprise or be happy, are a source of
empirical and theoretical puzzles in the literature on embedded questions. Although
they embed wh-questions, they seem not to embed whether-questions. They have
complex interactions with negative polarity items such as any or even, and they have
been argued to preferentially give rise to weakly exhaustive readings with embedded
questions (in contrasts with most other verbs, which have been argued to give rise
to strongly exhaustive readings). We offer an empirical overview of the situation in
three experiments collecting acceptability judgments, monotonicity judgments, and
truth-value judgments. The results straightforwardly confirm the special selectional
properties of emotive-factive predicates. More interestingly, they reveal the existence
of strongly exhaustive readings for surprise. The results also suggest that the spe-
cial properties of emotive-factives cannot be solely explained by their monotonicity
profiles, because they were not found to differ from the profiles of other responsive
predicates.
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1 Emotive-factive predicates and questions
Emotive-factive predicates are, as their name indicates, a class of factive predicates
of propositional attitudes involving emotions such as surprise, happiness, or regret. In
English, although some verbs of this class occur in traditional SVO constructions such
as (1a), they also occur in constructions like (1b) and (1c), or adjectival constructions
like (1d). Some constructions may also leave the emotion holder implicit, as in (1e).
The label ‘emotive-factive’ thus primarily refers to a semantic property and does not
apply to a homogeneous syntactic class of verbs.
(1) a. John regrets breaking the vase.
b. It surprised Peter that Mary came.
c. Peter was surprised that Mary came.
d. Mary is happy that Peter came.
e. It is amazing that John fixed the vase.
Emotive-factive predicates have drawn a lot of attention in the literature on embed-
ded questions, because they are associated with several puzzles that we quickly review
below. Given the recent dispute about the possible readings of embedded questions,
there now exist some quantitative surveys on this topic, but they only concern predi-
cates which are not emotive-factives (Cremers and Chemla 2016 on know and predict,
Chemla and George 2016 on agree, Phillips and George 2016 on know, Xiang 2016,
Chap. 4 on know and tell). The goal of this paper is to offer systematic empirical
coverage of the behavior of questions embedded under emotive-factive predicates. In
this section, we first introduce the phenomena and puzzles of interest. We will observe
that judgments and facts are sometimes difficult to assess based on the current claims
in the literature.
1.1 Two puzzles regarding questions and emotive-factives
1.1.1 Puzzle 1: Whether-questions
The first puzzle we want to introduce dates back to Karttunen (1977): although
emotive-factives generally embedwh-questions, theydonot embedwhether-questions,
as exemplified by the contrast between (2) and (3a,b) below. Grimshaw (1979) pro-
posed a first analysis of this fact based on the idea that wh-clauses embedded under
emotive-factives are actually exclamatives, but recent theories tend to treat them as
genuine questions and to put forward various other factors to explain the ungrammat-
icality of (3a,b). Some attribute it to the competition between the embedded questions
in (3a,b) and the embedded that-clauses in (4a,b), which are made equivalent by
a presupposition stronger than factivity (‘speaker-factivity’ or ‘super-factivity’: see
Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007; Guerzoni 2007; Sæbø 2007) or by anaphoric proper-
ties of emotive-factives (Herbstritt 2014; Roelofsen et al. to appear). Other analyses
propose that questions come with a determinate strength of exhaustivity and that
whether-questions force a strongly exhaustive reading which is incompatible with
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emotive-factives (see Nicolae 2015; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2014). Abels (2007) pro-
poses that the polar question in (3a) systematically fails to satisfy the presupposition
of surprise (but does not account for (3b)). Finally, Romero (in press) proposes that
the focus sensitivity properties of emotive-factives are at the source of the deviance of
(3a,b).
(2) It is amazing what they serve for breakfast.
(3) a. * It is amazing whether they serve breakfast.
b. * It is amazing whether they serve tea or coffee for breakfast.
(4) a. It is amazing that they serve breakfast / that they do not serve breakfast.
b. It is amazing that they serve tea / that they serve coffee for breakfast.
The different proposals also differ on the characterization of the puzzle itself.While
most authors take the unacceptability of (3a,b) as a case of plain ungrammatical-
ity, Sæbø (2007) argues, based on examples like (5), that under some circumstances
whether-questions are in fact acceptable with emotive-factives. Meanwhile, Herbstritt
(2014) and Roelofsen et al. (to appear), unlike others, attribute the ungrammaticality
of the polar question (3a) and the alternative question (3b) to different mechanisms,
which might lead us to expect differences in acceptability judgments for the corre-
sponding sentences.
(5) Don’t read this installment before seeing the episode if youwant to be surprised
at whether or not Hercules makes it.
1.1.2 Puzzle 2: Exhaustive readings
Focusing on well-formed constructions, we note that another dispute concerns the
possible meanings of constructions involving emotive-factives. Several readings have
been proposed for sentences with questions embedded under verbs like know, as in (6).
Karttunen (1977) first proposed the reading in (6a), which was later named “weakly
exhaustive” (WE), while Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982, 1984) argued for a stronger
reading, namely the “strongly exhaustive” (SE) reading in (6b).
(6) Mary knows who was at the party.
a. For each person who was at the party, Mary knows that he/she was.
b. For each person who was at the party, Mary knows that he/she was
and she knows that no one else was.
While know was traditionally considered to only (or predominantly) receive SE
readings (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982, 1984), Berman (1991) argued that surprise
must convey a WE reading. This introspective judgment has been endorsed by most
later authors—notably Heim (1994), who took it as the main argument for a theory
in which embedded questions are ambiguous between an SE and a WE reading.1 A
1 InHeim’s (1994) theory, full sentenceswith embedded questions are not ambiguous, because the predicate
selects the appropriate reading of the question it embeds.
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crucial empirical difference between know and surprise would be that, in a situation
where Mary knows who the students are, the inference in (7) seems valid while the
inference in (8) does not. Since the SE but not theWE readingmakes the two questions
“which students called” and “which students didn’t call” equivalent, we may conclude
that know but not surprise receives an SE reading.
(7) Mary knows which students called.
⇒ Mary knows which students didn’t call.
(8) It surprised Mary which students called.
 It surprised Mary which students didn’t call.
1.2 Monotonicity as a key to puzzles 1 and 2?
It has been suggested that some of the puzzling facts related to questions under
emotive-factive predicates may be explained by their specific entailment patterns
(Lahiri 2002, p37; Guerzoni 2003, 2007; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007; Uegaki 2015),
which were first studied by Wilkinson (1996) to explain the interaction between
emotive-factives and negative polarity items (NPIs). As an example, some theories
derive SE readings of embedded questions as implicatures (following Klinedinst
and Rothschild 2011), and therefore predict that they should not arise in the scope
of certain environments where scalar implicatures do not arise, such as negation
and some other downward-entailing operators.2 Whether-questions also have specific
interactions with NPIs, and some accounts relate the distribution of NPIs andwhether-
questions under responsive predicates (Guerzoni 2003; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007,
2014).
However, the different studies diverge regarding the monotonicity they attribute to
surprise (downward-entailing or non-monotonic), and little has been said about other
emotive-factive predicates (although see Uegaki 2015 on be happy). We therefore
tested the Strawson-entailment patterns associated with some of these predicates in the
same way that we collected data for their selectional properties and possible readings;
they are interesting because (a)monotonicity plays a role in some popular accounts, (b)
experimental data would help arbitrate between conflicting introspective judgments,3
and (c) the experimental literature suggests that ‘perceived monotonicity’ may be the
relevant factor (Chemla et al. 2011) and that it differs from actual monotonicity (e.g.,
because downward monotonicity is poorly evaluated in experimental tasks; Geurts
and van der Slik 2005).
2 In fact, Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011) argue that surprise does have an SE reading, the derivation of
which would require a local application of the exhaustivity operator in a downward-entailing environment.
Although very close in spirit, Uegaki (2015) departs from this view in assuming that this reading is not
available and by deriving its unavailability from the non-monotonicity of surprise.
3 Note that the theoretical characterization of the monotonicity of a predicate depends crucially on its deno-
tation. Uncertainty about the monotonicity of emotive-factive predicates amounts essentially to uncertainty
about their denotations. Experimental explorations of the semantic properties of a predicatemay thus inform




Given the interest in emotive-factive predicates and the large variety of theories pro-
posed to account for their properties, the main goal of this project was to gather
quantitative data in a theory-neutral perspective (asmuch as possible).We testedwhich
types of questions can be embedded under emotive-factives, what (exhaustive) read-
ings these embedded questions would carry, and what monotonicity properties are
associated with emotive-factives. We focused on testing various widespread claims
from the literature rather than predictions of specific theories, but this will not prevent
us from pointing out certain precise theoretical consequences of our data along the
way.
2 Experiment 1: Selectional properties of attitude predicates
2.1 Goals
The primary goal of this experiment was to test the selectional properties of emotive-
factives, but, as we explain below, this experiment was also an opportunity to address
a few other empirical questions regarding the selectional properties of various other
attitude predicates.
2.1.1 Selectional properties
The main goal of this experiment was to test the unacceptability of whether-questions
under emotive-factive verbs (Karttunen 1977; Grimshaw 1979). We also tested the
selectional properties of other attitude predicates and compared different comple-
ments. In Lahiri’s (2002) typology, emotive-factive predicates fall into the category
of responsive predicates, which take both declarative and interrogative complements
(e.g., know), in contrast with rogative verbs, which only embed interrogatives (e.g.,
wonder), and anti-rogative verbs, which only embed declaratives (e.g., believe).4 We
tested the (un)acceptability ofwhether-questions under emotive-factives against base-
lines of perfectly acceptable constructions and of constructions where the selectional
properties of the embedding predicate are violated. We also included the verb regret,
which has been claimed to be an exception among emotive-factives for not embedding
questions at all.
2.1.2 Degrees of unacceptability and the nature of the constraints
We will present the results of a task in which participants are asked to report their
acceptability judgments on a continuous scale (more on this below). We will not make
claims about how participants may have understood the task and wewill not draw con-
clusions from absolute judgments that people report on this scale. But the scale will
4 We use the terminology from Theiler et al. (2016), since anti-rogative verbs are not discussed in Lahiri
(2002).
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be calibrated by collecting baselines with allegedly acceptable sentences (questions
embedded under rogative predicates and declarative complements embedded under
anti-rogative predicates) and unacceptable sentences (the opposite: questions embed-
ded under anti-rogative predicates and declarative complements embedded under
rogative predicates). If these judgments come out right, we will be content to sup-
pose that the type of judgments we collect are of relevance to our linguistic inquiry
and will be in a position to interpret responses to more controversial cases relative to
these established baselines.
To take a different perspective on this practical issue: gathering quantitative accept-
ability measures of this sort may also allow us to evaluate finer-grained differences
in the degree of (un)grammaticality of different constructions; some violations may
have a stronger impact than others. Even without assuming differences in the degrees
of ungrammaticality, given the specifics of our experimental design we may be able
to detect some types of violations but not others. Let us be more concrete and see how
this could have theoretical relevance. Guerzoni (2007) and Sæbø (2007) propose that
whether-questions are ruled out under emotive-factives because they compete with
declaratives at the pragmatic level. In contrast, Nicolae (2013, 2015) and Guerzoni
and Sharvit (2014) propose thatwhether-questions are encoded as strongly exhaustive
and that emotive-factives select weakly exhaustive questions only. The former view
predicts mere pragmatic infelicity for whether-questions under surprise, while the
latter predicts a stronger grammatical incompatibility. In fact, the approach proposed
in Herbstritt (2014) and Roelofsen et al. (to appear) even predicts a difference between
polar questions and alternative questions; the infelicity of alternative questions under
emotive-factives is derived from a contradictory presupposition, whereas polar ques-
tions are eliminated through competition with a declarative complement (using the
maxim of manner; Grice 1975).5 We may expect all these differences to translate
into different degrees of unacceptability, even though the link between the strength
of incompatibilities and their nature (syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic) is not entirely
clear.
2.1.3 Quantificational variability
Quantificational variability effects (QVE; Berman 1991) constitute another phe-
nomenon related to embedded questions which has given rise to conflicting judgments
in the literature. The effect is visible in (9), which has a reading that is true if and only
if Mary knows of most students who called that they called.
(9) For the most part, Mary knows which students called.
The availability of QVE has been debated for rogative verbs. On the one hand,
Lahiri (2002) argues that rogatives can never receive QVE readings; his theory pre-
dicts a semantic type mismatch in any possible structure. Beck and Sharvit (2002),
5 However, Roelofsen et al. (to appear, fn. 13) discuss the possibility that this infelicity has been grammati-
calized over time. One difference between their account and Guerzoni (2007) is that under emotive-factives
they predict perfect synonymy between the polar question whether-p and the positive declarative that-p,




on the other hand, argue that in some cases QVE readings may be available. They
propose a semantics which can derive QVE for any rogative verb and suggest that
the unavailability of this reading in Lahiri’s (2002) examples is due to an indepen-
dent, softer constraint (subject to contextual variation). We took our experiment as
an opportunity to gather data on this issue. The idea was to use the acceptability of
sentences where a predicate modified by a quantity adverb embeds a wh-question as
a proxy for the availability of QVE. We did not test which reading participants had
for the target sentences, but our intuition was that if QVE readings are available, these
sentences should be more natural and receive a higher rating. Of course, many other
factors may affect the acceptability of these adverbs and one should keep in mind that
the measure of their acceptability is only a proxy for the availability of QVE. Never-
theless, foreshadowing the results of our experiment, the fact that the distribution of
acceptability ratings perfectly matched the judgments reported in Beck and Sharvit
(2002) regarding the availability of QVEmakes this factor a good candidate to explain
the differences we observed.6
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Task and instructions
Participants were asked to provide acceptability judgments for different sentences.
They provided a continuous response with a horizontal slider the ends of which were
labelled ‘weird’ and ‘natural’, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The instructions introduced a common context for the sentences. All sentenceswere
about aliens visiting the Earth, so that plausibility or conflict with world knowledge
would not interfere with participants’ judgments. To encourage participants to judge
the grammaticality of the sentences, and in particular to focus on selectional properties
of the verbs, the instructions provided the two examples in (10), which were described
as natural and odd respectively.
(10) a. Peter saw a fluffy purple alien playing the piano.
b. Peter went a fluffy purple alien playing the piano.
Four items were presented as warm-up to the participants, before the experimental
phase. These sentences were comparable to the sentences presented in the instructions
and of no interest to us. Nothing distinguished thewarm-up phase and the experimental
phase.
2.2.2 Design and stimuli
Two factors were crossed: Embedding Predicate (17 predicates from four broad cate-
gories, see Table 1) and Complement Type (5 levels, see Table 2). Three instances of
each combination were generated, for a total of 255 experimental items.
6 Lahiri (2002) shows that another reading may be available for rogative verbs with quantity adverbs, the
‘focus-affected’ reading, but this reading is intuitively harder to get and may require a specific prosody. In
any case, the focus-affected reading should be equally available for all rogative and responsive predicates,
so any difference we would find between the two types of predicates cannot be attributed to this reading.
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Fig. 1 Example of an item from Experiment 1, with an alternative question under forget
Each item was generated by drawing randomly from lists of proper names for
the agents, adjectives characterizing the aliens, and predicates describing what the
aliens did (complete lists are presented in Appendix 1). For each complement type,
the embedded clause (interrogative or declarative) was inserted in the comp argument
position of the schematic structures in Table 1. In the case of Adv+Which-Question,
the which-question was in the comp position but the adverbial phrase was appended
in sentence-initial position. Polar Question and Alternative Question only differed
Table 1 List of embedding predicates tested in Experiment 1 and the associated sentence structures
Predicate type Predicate Schematic structure
Emotive-factive Surprise1 (double object) It surprised X comp.
Surprise2 (passive) X is surprised (by) comp.
Regret X regrets comp.
Be happy X is happy (about) comp.
Responsive Know X knows comp.
Remember X remembers comp.
Forget X forgot comp.
Misunderstand X misunderstands comp.
Disregard X disregarded comp.
Agree X1 and X2 agree (on) comp.
Guess X guessed comp.
Anti-rogative Believe X believes comp.
Think X thinks comp.
Assume X assumes comp.
Rogative Wonder X wonders comp.
Depend comp depends on genetics.
Ask X asked comp.
Prepositions in parentheses were present with interrogative complements but absent with declarative com-
plements. Depend did not require any proper name; agree required two names, and we ensured that these
two names would always be different.
Table 2 List of complement
types tested in Experiment 1
Type Structure
Declarative …that the adj aliens pred.
Polar question …whether the adj aliens pred.
Alternative question …whether the adj aliens pred or pred′.
Which-question …which aliens pred.
Adv+Which-question For the most part, …which aliens pred.See text for details.
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in their pred complement: a specific version of each pred with a disjunction was
used to generate alternative questions. Note that questions of the form ‘whether A or
B’ are inherently ambiguous between an alternative and a polar reading (and this is
particularly truewhen they are presented as written stimuli rather than audio). To avoid
such confusion, we worked with native speakers to obtain questions which would be
as biased as possible towards the alternative reading, but we cannot guarantee that
these test items were never interpreted as polar questions (we will come back to this in
the presentation of the results). Examples for each complement type embedded under
various predicates are given in (11)–(15).
(11) surprise1 + Declarative:
“It surprised Mary that the fluffy aliens play the piano with their wings.”
(12) wonder + Polar Question:
“Peter wonders whether the hollow aliens can eat 5 pounds of licorice.”
(13) know + Alternative Question:
“Gracewonderswhether the red aliens drink sodawith a straworwith a spoon.”
(14) agree + Which-Question:
“Alex and Madison agree on which aliens write poems about the moon.”
(15) believe + Adv + Which-Question:
“For the most part, Jacob believes which aliens ride tall purple horses.”
2.2.3 Participants
In all, 50 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were paid $2
for their participation (age range: 21–64, 29 males).
2.2.4 Statistical methods
The data and analysis script for each experiment are available online at http://
semanticsarchive.net/Archive/GRhZmM4N/Cremers-Chemla-ExpEmotiveFactives.
html. Results were analyzed with R and the lme4 package (R Core Team 2014;
Bates et al. 2015b) and plotted with ggplot2 (Wickham 2009).
To compensate for differences in how participants used the continuous scale,
responses were centered and normalized by participant before any analysis. We fol-
lowed the procedure proposed by Bates et al. (2015a), who suggest to first try to fit
maximum random effects structures by participants and by item (as suggested in Barr
et al. 2013) and then eliminate useless components in the random effects structure to
avoid over-parametrization.7
7 More precisely,we alwaysfittedmodelswithmaximal by-subject and by-item randomstructures, although
they often did not converge. Then we used the function rePCA provided in the package RePsychLing to
remove all components which explained less than 0.1% of the variance explained by the main component.
This was done independently for the subject and item random effects structures, because random effects
associated with items tend to be smaller. We also removed correlations between random effects in the
updated “parsimonious” model. A second pass ensured that no component under the threshold remained
in the new model (this could happen when the PCA had been done on a maximal model which had not
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Fig. 2 Aggregated acceptability by predicate category and complement category in Experiment 1. In this
graph and all others, error bars correspond to standard error of the mean. The verbs regret, misunderstand,
and disregard were excluded from the analyses (see Fig. 3 for details). Whether-questions include both
polar and alternative questions. Sentences with an adverb of quantity are not shown in this figure.
For each relevant parameter, we report the 95% confidence interval (CI) rescaled
to the original 0–100 scale used in the graphs. The theoretically relevant comparisons
all yield very clear results, as the graphs will show.
2.3 Results
Figure 2 presents a summary of the results by predicate type (see Table 1). For a
break-down by predicate and results from the sentences with an adverb of quantity,
see Fig. 3. In Sect. 2.3.1, we first discuss the different categories of predicates one
by one, ignoring sentences with adverbs of quantity and differences between the two
types of whether-questions. We turn to the more specific issues addressed by these
conditions in a second stage of analysis in Sect. 2.3.2.
Misunderstand, disregard, and regret were removed from the analyses, since these
predicates did not reach 75% acceptability in any condition.
2.3.1 Predicate categories
Under anti-rogative predicates, declarative complements were well-accepted (CI:
[79, 86]),whereas interrogative complementswere degraded (CI: [34, 43] forwhether-
questions and [38, 48] for which-questions).8
Under rogative predicates, we observed the opposite pattern. Declarative comple-
ments were clearly degraded compared to all interrogative complements (CIs: [39, 49]
Footnote 7 continued
converged). All parsimonious models converged without requiring any further simplification, and whenever
the maximal models had converged, we found that they did not explain more variance than the parsimonious
models.
8 On declarative sentences, there was no difference between believe ([82, 88]), think ([79, 88]), and assume
([75, 85]). With wh-questions, assume was rated higher ([55, 69]). A quick search on the internet indeed
revealed some examples of questions under assume, such as “People like to assume which of my parents is
black or which of my parents is white.”
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Fig. 3 Acceptability for each predicate and complement in Experiment 1, by predicate category
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vs. [75, 81]). This difference showed up for all three verbs we tested, although the con-
trast was slightly reduced for ask.
With responsive predicates, all complements were clearly above 50%, although
whether-questions were slightly degraded. Leaving aside misunderstand and disre-
gard, all these verbs were qualitatively similar: equally compatible with declarative
complements ([79, 85]) and wh-questions ([80, 86]), and almost as acceptable with
whether-questions ([69, 74]). Veridical (know, forget, remember) and non-veridical
(agree, guess) responsive predicates did not differ significantly: a model with veridi-
cality, complement type, and their interactions as fixed effects showed no effect of
veridicality and no interaction (all t < 1.5, estimated effects below 1% acceptability).
Under emotive-factive predicates (excluding regret), declarative and which-
questions were as acceptable as under responsive verbs ([79, 86] and [78, 83]
respectively).9 This is in contrast with whether-questions, which were significantly
degraded compared to their acceptability under other responsive predicates ([46, 54]
vs. [69, 74]) but still more acceptable than under anti-rogative predicates ([34, 43]).
There was no significant difference between the overall acceptability of surprise1, sur-
prise2, and be happy. Regret was very degraded, even with declarative complements.
2.3.2 Specific questions
Rogative predicates and QVE: Under responsive, anti-rogative, and emotive-factive
predicates, we found that the presence of an adverb slightly reduced the acceptability
of a sentence with an embedded wh-question ([64, 67] vs. [68, 71]). The effect of the
adverb did not interact with the verb category (χ2(4) = 5.0, p = .29) but it had
an important effect within the class of rogative predicates: sentences with adverbs of
quantity were judged as unacceptable as sentences with declaratives for ask ([36, 52]),
as acceptable as sentences with interrogatives for depend ([75, 82]), and somewhere
in between for wonder ([58, 69]).
Polar and alternative questions: As is visible in Fig. 3, polar questions were less
acceptable than alternative questions across all predicates ([62, 67] vs. [69, 73]). First,
as mentioned earlier, alternative questions could in principle be interpreted as polar
questions. The fact that we observed a difference suggests that this was not always the
case, but one should keep in mind that actual contrasts between polar and alternative
questions may be stronger than the effect we observed. This difference may seem sur-
prising, because alternative questions were strictly more complex than polar questions
(they only differed in that they had an extra disjunct appended). From discussionwith a
dozen informants, it turned out that some speakers, mostly fromwestern regions of the
USA, dislike embedded whether-questions without an overt disjunction (they would
need to add “or not” in polar questions). With 50 participants, from only 26 states in
the USA, and no precise information regarding their linguistic background, we did
not have the adequate resources for a proper study of American dialects. Nevertheless,
longitude was a significant predictor of individual differences in the acceptability of
polar and alternative questions (t = −2.5, p = .02). Latitude did not have a signifi-
9 There is actually a statistically significant difference, but it is qualitatively very small: [0.8, 3].
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cant effect, but there was a trend for an interaction (t = 1.7, p = .09).10 We would
like to point out that Guerzoni and Sharvit (2014) assume that polar questions are
underlyingly alternative questions with a silent “or not”. The fact that some dialects
of American English require an overt “or not” suggests that such an analysis of polar
questions is on the right track.
2.4 Discussion
Our results confirm most judgments reported in the literature (see also Sprouse and
Almeida 2013; Sprouse et al. 2013 on the reliability of introspective judgments):
the four classes of predicates we discussed correspond to a natural typology based
on acceptability of declarative and interrogative complements. As expected, the
anti-rogative predicates were bad with any interrogative complement, the rogative
predicates displayed the opposite pattern (good with interrogatives, bad with declara-
tives), and the responsive predicates were goodwith any complement. Emotive-factive
predicates were equally good with declarative and wh-questions, but clearly degraded
with whether-questions.
Turning to new conclusions we can draw from this experiment, we observe that
whether-questions under emotive-factives, although degraded, are not as unacceptable
as under anti-rogative predicates. This suggests that the constraint ruling out whether-
questions under surprise must be different from the one ruling out questions under
believe (which itself is not well explained). Under the simplistic assumption that
pragmatic constraints are ‘softer’, ormore concretely that in our task participants donot
judgepragmatic violations too low, this result could support pragmatic accounts such as
Guerzoni (2007) and Sæbø (2007) for the unacceptability of whether-questions under
emotive-factives. These authors argue that the unacceptability is due to a contextual
competition with that-clauses (note however that Sæbø proposes a similar argument
for questions under believe, which is not supported by our results). Nevertheless, one
should be very careful in interpreting the strength of a constraint as an indication of
its semantic or pragmatic nature.
We did observe a contrast between polar and alternative questions, but it was not
specific to emotive-factive predicates and, if anything, it went in the opposite direction
fromwhat Herbstritt (2014) and Roelofsen et al. (to appear) might predict. Most likely,
this contrast can be explained as a syntactic constraint on the construction of polar
questions in some western dialects of American English. By contrast, we did not
observe any difference between the two constructions for surprise (the impersonal
construction and the passive-like construction with the presupposition by).
Regret was degraded with interrogatives, but also with declarative complements.
The first fact is a known puzzle in the literature (Lahiri 2002; Egré 2008); the second
10 We would like to thank Aparicio Kozuch, who insisted on adding “or not” to polar questions when we
were eliciting judgments for another project, thus suggesting this hypothesis. We would also like to thank
the many American linguists we met during the summer 2015 who kindly provided judgments, and Florian
Pellet, who included the question about state when programming the experiment and thus allowed us to test
the hypothesis. One outlier from Indiana who systematically rejected polar questions had to be removed
from the analyses.
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one is more surprising. It may be that regret requires some relation between its agent
and the proposition denoted by its complement. In our stimuli, the propositions denoted
by the declarative complements were facts about aliens, completely independent from
the agents. Alternatively, the class of emotive-factives may not be as homogeneous as
previously assumed and perhaps should be split into subclasses, with predicates like
surprise and be happy distinguished from verbs like regret and resent, which do not
embed questions.
Finally, the results for sentences headed by for the most part suggest variation in
the availability of QVE for rogative verbs. Of course, since we did not probe what
readings participants accessed but only the acceptability of the test sentences, we
cannot be sure that the availability of QVE is what drives the differences. However,
we would like to point out that (a) QVE seems to be the most salient reading for
these sentences (the alternative would be what Lahiri (2002) calls the focus-affected
reading, which would not explain the differences between predicates), and (b) the
differences we observed perfectly match Beck and Sharvit’s (2002) judgments on
the availability of QVE (available with depend on, unavailable with ask, unclear and
possibly context-dependent with wonder).
Before addressing the question of strong exhaustivity, we will first investigate the
monotonicity of emotive-factive predicates. This will inform us about the semantics
of the predicates themselves, without which we cannot even be sure of what their
exhaustive readings are.
2.5 Conclusions for Experiment 1
We collected naive speakers judgments pertaining to the selectional properties of
embedding predicates. The results confirmed most judgments from the theoreti-
cal literature. New observations include the contrast between the acceptability of
whether-questions under emotive-factive and anti-rogative predicates, a small dif-
ference between polar and alternative questions (which may be explained by dialectal
differences), and data on adverbs of quantity which may inform the debate on QVE
with rogative predicates. In the remainder of this paper, we move on to more semanti-
cally oriented investigations, focusing on constructions that were judged grammatical
in this experiment. We will first investigate the monotonicity of emotive-factive pred-
icates when they embed straight declarative complements. This will inform us about
the semantics of the predicates themselves and is in fact a prerequisite to studying
exhaustive readings they could give rise to when they embed questions, an issue we
turn to in the final experiment.
3 Experiment 2: On the monotonicity of responsive predicates
3.1 Goal
The goal of this experiment was to determine the monotonicity of some emotive-
factive predicates. This is important for at least two reasons. First, various special
properties of these verbs (e.g., NPI licensing abilities, selectional properties, avail-
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able readings) have been linked to their monotonicity profiles. Second, judgments
in the theoretical literature diverge. Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) consider surprise
to be Strawson-downward entailing, whereas Uegaki (2015) takes surprise to be
Strawson-non-monotonic. Furthermore, most of the literature focuses on surprise,
and we thought it would be interesting to test be happy which, we hypothesized,
might be judged ‘less’ downward entailing.
It is indeed worth noting that the relevant theoretical concept is not classical mono-
tonicity but Strawson-monotonicity, which describes the entailment patterns between
complements of a predicate, provided all presuppositions are satisfied. In order to
assess Strawson-monotonicity, we thus tested monotonicity-like inference patterns,
augmented with premises which would guarantee that the presuppositions of all rele-
vant propositions would be true.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Task and instructions
This experiment was an inferential task with continuous responses, in which we tested
the inference patterns of various environments that embed propositions. While graded
responses are common in experiments collecting grammaticality judgments, their use
in an inferential taskmay be a non-obvious decision.We submit that similar arguments
can hold for their use in both cases, however: they may help detect otherwise hidden
effects, and differences they reveal call for an explanation. Furthermore, we hope that
testing systematically both upward and downward inferences for a single environment
can help clean up some of the artificial effects which may have been created by the
response scale. Other experiments using such a response scale have convinced us
that they could yield fruitful and relevant results in line with the kind of judgments
linguists typically work with (a similar scale was applied to collect judgments about
presuppositions in Chemla 2009, scalar implicatures in Chemla and Spector 2011,
as well as monotonicity judgments in Chemla et al. 2011). As illustrated in Fig. 4,
experimental items consisted of two premises and one conclusion.
The instructions introduced a minimal common context for the whole experiment,
as in Experiment 1 (all sentences were about aliens who have just spent a week on
Fig. 4 Example of a direct item in Experiment 2. One can see that the predicate in the second premise
(read sci-fi novels) is stronger than the predicate in the conclusion (read books). The “fact” (first premise)
ensures that the opaque aliens read sci-fi novels, thus validating the factive presuppositions of both the
second premise and the conclusion.
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Earth). The instructions provided the two examples in (16a)/(17a) followed by the
explanations in (16b)/17b).
(16) a. There are pink aliens and blue aliens.
Less than 50 pink aliens play the piano.
⇒ Less than 50 pink aliens play the piano with their left hand.
b. “In this case, you should put the bar close to the right [strong]. Indeed, if
in total less than 50 pink aliens play the piano, there cannot be more than
50 pink aliens who play the piano with their left hand.”
(17) a. The blue aliens live in tree houses 10 feet above the ground with rope
ladders.
Peter knows that the blue aliens live in tree houses.
⇒ Peter knows that the aliens live in tree houses 10 feet above the ground.
b. “Here you should put the bar close to the left [weak], because even if Peter
knows that the blue aliens live in tree houses, nothing indicates that he
knows that their tree houses are 10 feet above the ground.”
The two examples in the instructions were given as the first actual items, so that
participants would be familiarizedwith the presentation and task before tackling actual
items of interest.
3.2.2 Design and stimuli
We tested direct inferences, where the proposition embedded in the premise entailed
the proposition embedded in the conclusion, and indirect inferences, where the propo-
sition embedded in the second premise was asymmetrically entailed by the proposition
embedded in the conclusion.Wecrossed two factors: Environment (8 levels) andDirec-
tion of the Inference (2 levels). Participants saw 8 repetitions of each combination plus
16 filler items, for a total of 144 items.
Most sentences tested in this experiment were minor modifications of sentences
which received very high ratings in Experiment 1.
Participants were asked to indicate how strongly the conclusion followed from
the premises using a horizontal slider whose ends were labelled ‘weak’ and ‘strong’.
The first premise was always a “fact” which ensured that the presuppositions of the
second premise and the conclusion were satisfied, thus allowing us to test Strawson-
entailment rather than classical entailment. To make the sequence less repetitive and
more natural, the fact was always a conjunctive statement, with one conjunct being
the presupposition (of the second premise or of the conclusion, depending on which
one was the strongest). The second premise and the conclusion only differed in the
predicate of their embedded clause. These predicates could be “strong” (pred+) or
“weak” (pred−), and this allowed us to test both directions of inference. Direct items
tested the inference from the strong to the weak, which is only valid in Strawson-
upward-entailing (SUE) contexts. Indirect items tested the inference from the weak
to the strong, which is only valid in Strawson-downward-entailing (SDE) contexts.
They were obtained by switching the conclusion with the second premise in a Direct
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Table 3 List of attitudes tested in Experiment 2, and the associated sentence structures
Predicate type Predicate Schematic structure
Emotive-factive Surprise X was surprised that…
Be happy X was happy that…
Other responsive Know X knew that…
Forget X forgot that…
Agree X1 agrees with X2 that…
Agree required two names, which we ensured were always different from each other. We used the agree
with form this time because it introduces a presupposition without being a factive verb.
item. Strawson-non-monotonic (SNM) contexts make both the direct and the indirect
inferences invalid.
Table 3 presents the attitude predicates tested in Experiment 2, and Table 4 presents
the structure for each item type. We tested the emotive-factives surprise and be happy.
To keep the sentences with emotive-factives superficially similar to those using other
attitude predicates, we used the SVO-like construction: ‘Mary is surprised/happy
that…’. We compared surprise and be happy to three other responsive verbs: know
and agree, which we expected to be SUE, and forget, which we expected to be SDE.
For agree, we used the structure ‘Peter agrees withMary that…’.11 We used three con-
trol constructions without attitude verbs to serve as a baseline for UE, DE, and NM
environments.12 We created valid fillers to counterbalance the fact that NM controls
made all inferences invalid. All items were in the past tense, except for agree, where
the main verb was in present tense.
Each participant saw 8 repetitions of each condition, obtained by picking a triplet
of instantiations for pred, adj, and proper names, with the constraint that Direct
items and corresponding Indirect items were matched for each participant (i.e., con-
structed on the same 8 triplets). Each participant thus saw a total of 144 items: 8
(environment) × 2 (direct vs. indirect) × 8 (repetitions) test items, and 16 direct
only-fillers.
11 There were a few reasons for this move. The collective form with a plural subject, which we used in
the previous experiment, should not contribute to a decrease in acceptability compared to other predicates
with a singular subject, but its semantic effects are not fully understood. The construction ‘John agrees
with Mary that p’ allows for a singular subject (and therefore simplifies issues of cumulative readings).
It also has a better-understood presupposition (that Mary believes p), which allowed the use of a uniform
underlying structure to construct the material (in which the first premise validates a presupposition of
the second premise). Note that in a task testing the semantics of question-embedding agree, Chemla and
George (2016) found nodifference between these two constructions. They did not test embedded declaratives
however.
12 The reader may notice that our NM controls are actually not SNM (they were constructed with only,
so they are SDE). However, since the ‘fact’ for these items did not validate the UE presupposition of
only, the end result was an environment which made both directions of inference invalid (i.e., was non-
monotonic). We preferred only over genuine SNM expressions such as ‘exactly n’, which were too hard to
process to provide a proper baseline. The results confirmed our intuition that only is easily understood as
non-monotonic.
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Table 4 Structure for each item type appearing in Experiment 2
Predicate Sentence Schematic structure
Factive attitude V Fact The adj aliens pred∧.
Strong/Weak X V that the adj aliens pred+/−.
Agree Fact X2 believes that the adj aliens pred∧.
Strong/Weak X1 agrees with X2 that the adj aliens pred+/−.
UE Fact There are adj1 aliens and adj2 aliens.
Strong/Weak The adj1 aliens pred+/−.
DE Fact There are adj1 aliens and adj2 aliens.
Strong/Weak The adj1 aliens didn’t pred+/−.
NM Fact There are adj1 aliens and adj2 aliens.
Strong/Weak Only 12 adj1 aliens pred+/−.
Only-fillers Fact There are adj1 aliens and adj2 aliens.
Strong Only 12 adj1 aliens pred+.
Weak At least 5 adj1 aliens pred−.
The ‘fact’ was always the first premise. The ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sentences alternately played the roles
of second premise and conclusion. All attitudes except agree were factive and shared the same structure,
illustrated in the first line of the table. The only-fillers only appeared in a direct version (inference from
the strong to the weak). See Appendix 2 for details about the lists from which proper names, adj, and the
different types of pred were drawn.
3.2.3 Participants
In all, 50 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were paid $2
for their participation (age range: 19–58, 29 males).
3.2.4 Statistical methods
For statistical analyses, responses were centered and normalized by participants. The
responses to targets were further transformed, as discussed in Sect. 3.3.2 (we projected
the two-dimensional response space <Direct, Indirect> onto two new dimensions
determined by the responses to controls). As in the previous experiment, we used
parsimonious mixed-effects models, following Bates et al. (2015a). We fitted random
effects for pred, which was the most crucial random variation between items (we did
not fit random effects for adj since that would have increased the risk of models not
converging and was unlikely to have an important effect to begin with).
3.3 Results
Figure 5 presents responses to Indirect items as a function of responses to Direct items,
for each environment. In such a representation, SUE items should be attracted towards
the lower-right corner and SDE items towards the opposite, upper-left corner. SNM






































Fig. 5 Responses to Indirect as a function of responses to Direct items, for each environment. In such a
representation, SUE predicates should fall to the bottom-right corner (making Direct inferences valid, but
Indirect inferences invalid). SDE predicates are expected to reverse this pattern and appear at the top-left
corner. SNM predicates should make any inference invalid, and therefore fall at the bottom-left corner.
The two dashed lines represent the dimension which we projected on for the statistical analyses (although
this projection was actually done on normalized responses rather than on the raw data). The orange arrows
indicate the directions in which SUE, SDE, and SNM predicates should deviate from the central point.
3.3.1 Control items
We fitted a mixed-effects model for each inference type (Direct and Indirect) on the
three control conditions with full random by-subject and by-item effects (Environment
is both a within-subject and a within-item effect). The first one was fitted on responses
to the Direct items; it showed that Direct inferences were judged more valid in UE
controls than in NM controls (t = 6.8, p < .001), and more valid in NM controls
than in DE controls (t = 2.9, p = .004). The Indirect inferences were judged equally
low in UE and NM conditions (t = −.2, p = .84), but were significantly more valid
in the DE condition (t = 7.7, p < .001).
3.3.2 Attitude predicates
Using the control items, we defined two new dimensions along which we analyzed
the attitude predicates.
First dimension (“Deviation from monotonicity”): We determined the representa-
tive UE , DE , and NM positions in the bidimensional space of Direct and Indirect
responses as the average of the responses to the UE, DE, and NM control items. We
then computed the projection of each response on the axis starting at the midpoint of
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the [UE, DE] segment and going towards NM . A non-null value on this axis repre-
sents a tendency towards non-monotonicity.13 We then fitted a mixed-effects model
on these dependent variables. We included Environment as a fixed effect (5 levels,
corresponding to the 5 attitudes tested) and full random by-subject and by-item struc-
ture (including slopes for Environment, which as mentioned is both within-subject and
within-item). None of the fixed effects was significant (all |t | < .7), and a model with
only an intercept explained just as much variance (χ2(4) = .6, p = .96; note that the
intercept itself was very close to zero t = −.2). This suggests that no predicate yields
non-monotonicity.
Second dimension (“Upwardness”): We fitted a mixed-effects model on the pro-
jections on the [UE, DE] line of responses for each predicate, to determine whether
that verb was more SUE or SDE. This time, we found clear differences between verbs
(χ2(4) = 20, p < .001). As a post-hoc analysis, we compared attitude predicates two-
by-two, following their order on the [UE, DE] line. Based on Bonferroni-corrected
p-values for 4 comparisons, know was similar to agree (χ2(1) = 3.4, p′ = .26),
which was slightly more upward-monotonic than be happy (χ2(1) = 5.6, p′ = .073).
Be happywas clearly more upwardmonotonic than surprise (χ2(1) = 11, p′ = .003),
which did not differ significantly from forget (χ2(1) = 1.3, p′ = 1). Even though
surprise and forget were judged more downward entailing than other verbs, they were
still very far from the DE controls.
3.4 Discussion
First, let us address a potential issue with complex presuppositions which we did not
control for.14 Some of the verbs we tested are not only factive but presuppose some
form of knowledge: forget presupposes past knowledge, surprise presupposes that the
agent came to know the complement, and be happy presupposes awareness. Provided
basic assumptions about beliefs, these presuppositions are all upward-entailing. It
seems natural to assume that participants accommodated these presuppositions in the
premises, and therefore all presuppositions of the conclusionwere satisfied in the direct
targets (the x-axis in Fig. 5). However, this is not true of indirect targets. Indeed, even if
participants accepted the premise “Benjamin forgot that the opaque aliens read books”
and accommodated that Benjamin used to know that opaque aliens read books, this
would not grant that the presupposition of “Benjamin forgot that the opaque aliens read
sci-fi novels” is satisfied, and some participants could have rejected the indirect targets
even though they have a SDE reading of forget, be happy, or surprise. In short, this
issue could have led us to underestimate the values on the y-axis in Fig. 5. Therefore,
the correct positions for surprise, forget, and be happy may be higher than our data
suggest. But any point above the UE-DE line would represent a trivial environment
(one that validates both UE and DE inferences) and these verbs are all exactly on the
13 Negative values are not expected, since they would translate a tendency towards tautology (making too
many inferences valid).
14 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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line. We thus conclude that the upward-entailing presuppositions of the tested verbs
did not affect the results.
Most verbs ended up being perceived as upward entailing. We may imagine that
this is an artifact of the task, which could induce a general “upwardness” bias. This
may be due to low-level strategies adopted by some of the participants. A few of them
reported basing their answers on the subcategory/super-category relations between
complements of the embedded clauses. These kinds of strategies would ultimately
lead a participant to ignore the embedding environment and respond based on the
complement clauses alone (creating a de facto UE environment). Nevertheless, par-
ticipants as a group made clear distinctions between the control items, in the expected
directions: UE controls made the direct inference valid and the indirect inference
invalid, DE controls reversed this pattern, and NM controls made all inferences less
valid.
The results on attitude predicates, validated by the clear results on controls, thus
suggest that we can distinguish two classes of predicates based on monotonicity:
know, agree, and be happy on the one hand, which are clearly upward entailing, and
forget and surprise on the other hand, which may be perceived as more downward
entailing. We can draw two conclusions from this result. Crucially, the two emotive-
factive predicates we tested were not perceived as less monotonic than other verbs.
As a result, monotonicity appears to be orthogonal to the selectional properties of the
verbs. Indeed, the groups that emerged here both contain verbs that embed whether-
questions and verbs that do not.
No theory draws a direct connection between monotonicity properties and the
acceptability of whether-questions. However, it has been suggested that (i) whether-
questions are only acceptable under predicates for which a strongly exhaustive
reading is available (Nicolae 2013, 2015; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2014), and (ii) that
emotive-factive predicates do not allow strongly exhaustive readings because of their
monotonicity properties (Uegaki 2015). If both (i) and (ii) were true, we would
have observed a link between monotonicity properties and acceptability of whether-
questions, but the results of Experiments 1 and 2 show a complete lack of correlation
between these two properties. In the next experiment, we investigate the availability of
strongly exhaustive readings under know, forget, and surprise, in order to understand
which of (i) or (ii) is faulty (if not both).
4 Experiment 3: Strongly exhaustive readings
4.1 Motivations and additional background
Themain goal of this experimentwas to test the availability of strongly exhaustive (SE)
readings for questions embedded under know, forget, and surprise. Berman (1991) was
the first to argue that surprise only gives rise to weakly exhaustive (WE) readings, and
most introspective judgments in the literature agree.15
15 Among exceptions, some do not challenge Berman’s judgment on the assertive component but argue for
different presuppositions. In particular, Abels (2007) and George (2011) propose a mention-some reading
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The (un)availability of SE readings with surprise has been linked to the mono-
tonicity properties of this verb, as well as, independently, to its selectional properties.
Importantly, however, forget shares the monotonicity properties of surprise (Experi-
ment 2), but patternswith knowwhen it comes to selectional properties (Experiment 1),
so if there is a link between these two properties, it has to be mediated by yet another
factor. By testing the availability of SE readings with these three verbs, we should in
principle be able to disentangle all possible links between monotonicity, exhaustivity,
and selectional properties.
Before presenting our experiment, let us first review basic assumptions about
know, forget, and surprise. Our goal is to list conceivable readings for sentences
where they embed questions. We will then be in a position to evaluate the availabil-
ity of each of these readings. More specifically, we will be able to assess whether
surprise gives rise to an SE reading, factoring out the influence of other possible
readings.
4.1.1 Know
Denotation: We will assume a very simple denotation for know: ‘John knows p’
presupposes that p is true and asserts that John believes p. There are constraints on
what types of beliefs count as (justified) knowledge, but we designed our experiment
such that the beliefs attributed to agents clearly satisfy these constraints.
Readings: Know has receivedmore attention than any other question-embedding pred-
icate, and this is reflected in the wide variety of readings proposed in the literature.
We will provide a list of these readings in (19).
Different exhaustive readings have been proposed, which have in common that for
John to know who was at the party, they at least require that for each person who
actually was at the party, John know that they were. The WE reading does not require
anything else (Karttunen 1977), whereas the Intermediate Exhaustive (IE) reading
further requires that John would not falsely believe that anyone else was at the party
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982; Berman 1991; Preuss 2001; Spector 2005), and the
most stringent Strong Exhaustive (SE) reading requires John to know that no one else
was at the party (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982).
It has been argued that questions embedded under know can sometimes give rise to
weaker, non-exhaustive readings, which do not require the agent to know a complete
answer to the question. As an example, (18) may be true as soon as Rupert knows of
one place where Italian newspapers can be purchased, without knowing the exhaustive
list of all such places. This reading is often called the mention-some reading.
(18) Rupert knows where he can buy an Italian newspaper.
Footnote 15 continued
instead of the WE reading (hence a weaker presupposition), while Spector and Egré (2015) propose a
WE reading for the assertion, but an SE presupposition. Although everyone acknowledges that the WE
reading is available, Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011, fn. 18) argue that an SE reading is possible in some
circumstances, and Theiler (2014) elaborates on this idea by suggesting that emotive-factives are ambiguous




As for exhaustive readings, differentmention-some readings have been proposed in the
literature. In particular, George (2011, 2013) argues for a stronger notion of mention-
some reading, which requires Rupert to know one true answer to the question, but
also not to have any false beliefs regarding the selling of Italian newspaper at other
places. We will call this the ‘false-belief-sensitive mention-some’ reading, which we
will abbreviate as FBS-MS. By contrast, we will call ‘weak mention-some’ (WMS)
the mention-some reading that requires knowledge of at least one true answer without
any further constraint.
Cremers and Chemla (2016) and Xiang (2016, Chap. 4) provide experimental evi-
dence for the availability of all exhaustive readings (WE, IE, and SE); Phillips and
George (2016) andXiang (Xiang (2016), Chap. 4) do so for themention-some readings
(WMS and FBS-MS). This leads us to the list of readings in (19).
(19) Mary knows which of her cards are spades.
WE: For each actual spade, Mary knows that it is a spade.
IE: For each actual spade, Mary knows that it is a spade,
and she does not falsely believe that any other card is a spade.
SE: For each actual spade, Mary knows that it is a spade,
and she knows that no other card is a spade.
WMS: There is an actual spade that Mary knows to be a spade.
FBS-MS: There is an actual spade that Mary knows to be a spade,
and she has no false beliefs regarding other cards.
Let us make a note about presuppositions. Although know normally triggers a fac-
tive presupposition, no such presupposition arises with embedded questions. Instead,
the different readings all relate agents to propositions which are actually true (true
answers), and a factive presupposition does not show up beyond this (because, in
short, it would simply say that the true answers are true).
4.1.2 Forget
Denotation: Little has been said about forget, but the semi-formal denotation in (20)
should not be controversial. According to (20), forget presupposes that there used to
be a correct belief (which is different from a factive presupposition, because it is in
the past), and asserts that there is no such belief anymore.16
(20) forget = λpst .λxe.
[
p ∧ believed(p)(x); ¬believe(p)(x)
]
Readings: Fewer readings have been proposed for forget. Most theories predict that
it only receives a WE reading. Heim (1994) proposed a systematic way to strengthen
WE into SE readings, which applies here to complete the list in (21).17
16 We simplify details about time, and simply assume that the presupposition is about a time strictly anterior
to the assertion.
17 There is no systematic definition of an IE reading which would apply blindly to the embedding predicate.
Instead, there could be several ways to generalize the IE reading to verbs other than know (e.g., adding
absence of false belief to the WE reading, or adding negation of a presupposition-less version of the verb),
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(21) Mary forgot which of her cards are spades.
WE: Mary does not remember that all actual spades are spades.
= For at least one actual spade, she forgot that it is a spade.
SE: Mary does not remember that all actual spades are spades
and all other cards are not spades.
= For at least one card, she forgot whether it is a spade.
Two remarks are in order. First, forget presupposes past knowledge, and as a result
the WE reading is predicted to presuppose that Mary used to know which of her cards
are spades in the WE sense, and the SE reading that she used to know it in the SE
sense. In our experiment, we ensured that there was always support for the strongest
possible presupposition, so that this should not play any role. Specifically, the design
ensured that the agent had known at some point the suit of each card, a fact which
is stronger than any possible presupposition for the relevant sentence. Second, we
leave aside issues regarding homogeneity effects among the entities being quantified
over in the embedded questions (Cremers, in prep; Križ 2015), which may give rise
to stronger readings (e.g., ‘Mary forgot of all actual spades that they are spades’). To
anticipate on the results, it turns out such effects did not play any role.
4.1.3 Surprise
Denotation: Several denotations have been proposed for surprise. Most prominently,
Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) proposed the Strawson-downward-entailing entry in (22)
(from which we dropped the presupposition of speaker-factivity, which is not relevant
for our purposes). According to this denotation, ‘x was surprised that p’ presupposes
that p is true and that x knows it, and it asserts that x expected ¬p to be true. We may
also consider the weaker denotation in (23), with which the assertion would merely be
that x did not expect p to be true. We refer to this denotation as the ‘NE’ denotation,
for ‘Not Expected’. We note that the wide scope of the negation here is closer to what
we see in the denotation we considered for forget in (20).
(22) surpriseG&S = λpst .λxe.
[
p ∧ believe(p)(x); expected(¬p)(x)
]
(23) surpriseNE = λpst .λxe.
[
p ∧ believe(p)(x); ¬expected(p)(x)
]
Uegaki (2015) proposed yet another entry, given in (24), which is non-monotonic.
Given the results from Experiment 2, which showed no sign of non-monotonicity for
surprise, we disregard this denotation.
(24) surpriseU = λpst .λxe.
[
p ∧ believe(p)(x); ∀w′ ∈ DOXwx ,
Simw′(¬p) <expx,w Simw′(p)
]
≈ ‘x expected ¬p more than she expected p’
Footnote 17 continued
but in practice, for forget and downward-entailing predicates in general, all theories block what could
correspond to such an IE reading.
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Readings: The WE and SE readings corresponding to each of the denotations in (22)
and (23) are given in (25). There is a debate, however, as to how the presupposition
of surprise surfaces when it embeds questions (Abels 2007; George 2011; Spector
and Egré 2015). In the experiment described below, we abstracted away from these
difficulties by making sure that the strongest possible presupposition was supported
by the evaluation context, as we did for forget. Specifically, the setup ensured that the
agent eventually knows the suit of each card.
(25) Jacob was surprised by which of his cards are clubs.
WE: Jacob expected some actual clubs not to be clubs.
SE: Jacob expected some actual clubs not be clubs,
or some other cards to be clubs.
NE-WE: It is not the case that Jacob expected all actual clubs to be clubs.
NE-SE: It is not the case that Jacob expected all actual clubs to be clubs
and all other cards not to be clubs.
Having surveyed the possible readings for sentences with embedded questions
under know (19), forget (21), and surprise (25), wewill now present our experiment on
the availability of these readings, including the controversial SE reading for surprise.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Task
We adapted the truth-value judgment task that Cremers and Chemla (2016) used to
detect exhaustive readings for questions embedded under know. The task requires par-
ticipants to evaluate the truth of sentences with embedded questions against a general
background (given in the instructions) and a picture representing both a situation in the
actual world and the mental state of the subject of the sentence in this situation. The
relevant mental states were beliefs for know and forget and expectations for surprise.
Different situations then introduced various discrepancies between the agent’s mental
state and the presented reality, which made different readings of the relevant sentences
true and false. This allowed us to run a reading detection analysis, as explained below.
4.2.2 Instructions and training phase
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received the following instructions:
(26) “A group of friends is playing a kind of poker game in which each player gets
dealt a hand of 7 cards. When they receive their cards, they only have a quick
look at them and try not to show any emotion, while still remembering the
cards.
You will see the hands that one of them got in each round, and either which
suits they expected or what they remember about the cards. The players often
mistake the suits (for instance they remember clubs instead of spades), and
sometimes they completely forget what some of their cards were.
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Youwill have to judge whether sentences about their memories or expectations
are true or false.”
As we mentioned in the Introduction, all tested verbs have a factive presupposition
which is trivially satisfied when they embed questions, but forget and surprise have
additional presuppositions: forget presupposes that the agent used to know the answer
to the question, while surprise presupposes that she now knows it. While there may be
some debates regarding howmuch the agent had to know/must have come to know, the
story in the instructions ensured that the agent saw all of his/her cards at some point,
and therefore ensured that the contextwould support even the strongest presupposition.
The instructions also included 4 example items with explanations about why the
correct answer was True or False in each case. After the instructions, participants were
presentedwith 5 training items (in randomorder) to help them familiarizewith the task.
After answering a training item, participants received feedback which consisted in a
green “Correct!” message for 350ms if the answer was correct, and a red message for
8s containing explanations on why their answer was incorrect otherwise. The disparity
in feedback durations created an incentive to be accurate and allowed participants to
look back at the picture to understand their mistake when they gave a wrong answer.
4.2.3 Design and stimuli
Each item consisted of two rows of seven playing cards and a sentence that participants
were asked to judge true or false, as can be seen in the examples presented in Fig. 6.
Stimuli were based on two crossed factors: Predicate (3 levels), which was pertinent
(mostly) for the sentence, and Situation type (5 levels), which was pertinent for the
picture.
Sentences:The sentences were all of the form “Name verbwhich of [his/her] cards
are suit”, where Name was drawn randomly from a list of 20 male and 20 female
names, verb was one of ‘knows’, ‘forgot’, or ‘was surprised by’, the possessive
pronoun agreed with the name, and suit was one of ‘hearts’, ‘diamonds’, ‘clubs’, and
‘spades’. For instance, a sentence for forget could be “Mary forgot which of her cards
are clubs”. Our goal was to explore the truth-conditions of the sentences by displaying
them in various conditions, introduced through pictures.
Pictures: Pictures displayed two rows of playing cards. The first row was meant to
represent the ‘actual’ situation. The second row represented the relevant mental state
of an agent about each of the cards in the first row. For know and forget, the relevant
type of mental state is belief, and each card in the second row could thus be a match
with the first row (correct belief), a mismatch (false belief), or a special type of card
representing absence of belief by displaying two shapes simultaneously. For surprise,
the relevant type of mental state concerns expectations, and the card could thus be
a match (satisfied expectation), a mismatch (failed expectation), or a special card
representing absence of firm expectation by representing two shapes simultaneously.
This card system thus allows one to represent different types of relations between
mental states of an agent and the actualworld. In particular, one can introduce two types
of discrepancies: I(gnorance) or C(onflict) about a particular card. And the discrepancy
could concern either a card which is actually of the suit mentioned in the sentence
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Fig. 6 Two items from Experiment 3. (a) An I target for know. Under an SE reading, we expect a ‘False’
answer. Under a WE or an IE reading, we expect a ‘True’ answer. (b) A C target for surprise. Under an
SE reading, we expect a ‘True’ answer. Under a WE reading, we expect a ‘False’ answer.
(⊕), or a card which is actually part of a suit different than the one mentioned in the
sentence (). Very much in the spirit of Xiang (2016, Chap. 4) then, we constructed
five conditions: one with no discrepancy at all (N), and four with discrepancies of
each of the different 2×2 possible types, I⊕, I, C⊕, C, which—for know and
forget—correspond to the under-affirming, under-denying, over-denying, and over-
affirming conditions respectively. For surprise, I⊕ amounts to the expectation that at
most the actual target cards, and possibly less, be of the correct suit; I⊕ amounts to
the expectation that at least the actual cards, and possibly more, be of the target suit;
and C⊕ and C amount to the expectation of strictly less and strictly more cards of
the target suit, respectively. When the condition involved one of these discrepancies,
that discrepancy was always instantiated by two cards.18
18 More situations could in principle be constructed and tested: some which would mix different types of
discrepancies (e.g., an actual false belief on a positive card and ignorance on a negative card, a C⊕+I
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All cards were taken randomly from the range of ace to 10 (thus excluding the king,
queen, and jack, which might have been harder to categorize). The actual cards were
always sorted in the following order: diamonds, hearts, clubs, spades. Depending on
whether the sentence was about a red suit (heart/diamond) or a black suit (club/spade),
there were 5 red cards and 2 black cards, or the opposite. The expectations/memories
described by the test sentences were only about the suits, not about the pips (numbers);
therefore cards in the second row did not have a pip but only a suit symbol (this also
discouraged purely visual matching of the top and bottom cards). Whenever there was
a discrepancy between the two rows, it was always within color (i.e., a player could
mistake a heart for a diamond, but not for a spade).19
Interaction between sentences and pictures: Table 5 provides the predicted truth
value of each reading of each sentence in each condition. The table makes visible a
few facts we discussed earlier. First, the WE, IE, and SE readings only diverge in the
“negative” situations I and C, i.e. cases where the discrepancies between a player’s
mental state and the actual world concern cards which are not of the target suit (the
“negative” part of the predicate). Second, we can see what responses are predicted.
If we assume the ‘not-expected’ denotation for surprise in (23), we obtain the exact
same predictions as for forget. If we assume the more standard denotation for surprise
in (22), we then obtain different predictions in the Ignorance conditions ( or ⊕): If
Chris has no specific expectation regarding which suit a card will be, we predict that
he cannot be surprised when it turns out to be a diamond (with forget, if Chris has no
idea whether his third card is a heart or a diamond, we can say he forgot the suit of this
card).
4.2.4 Participants
In all, 47 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were paid
$1.80 for their participation (age range: 19–65). Two participants were excluded
from the analysis because they did not report English as their native language.
Three more participants were excluded because their error rate exceeded the aver-
age by more than one standard deviation (threshold: 34%; error rates were calculated
on uncontroversial items for which all readings lead to the same truth value in
Table 5).
Footnote 18 continued
situation, say) or some which would cover the cards differently (e.g., contrasting violated expectations on
some positive cards vs. violated expectations on all positive cards). These possibilities were left aside for
the time being. The ‘simple’ situations were sufficient to test all the readings listed in (19), (21), and (25).
19 This, and the fact that Ignorance was represented as a hesitation between two suits of the same color,
helped control for possible non-monotonic results of surprise, corresponding to the denotation proposed
by Uegaki (2015). Indeed, he suggests that surprise(p)(x) = 1 if and only iff x expected ¬p more than
p. If we were to represent Ignorance with a question mark as in Cremers and Chemla (2016), there would
be four alternatives (corresponding to the four suits). Assuming they are all equally likely, this would yield
a probability of 3/4 for ¬p (‘the card is not a club’) and only 1/4 for p (‘the card is a club’), thus making
Ignorance practically equivalent to Conflict. Here we made sure there were only two alternatives, ensuring
equal probability to p and ¬p.
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Table 5 Readings tested for know, forget, and surprise, the expected responses for a participant who would





(a) Readings, predicted responses, and estimated share of participants’ responses for each reading of “X
knows which of his/her cards were clubs”. The proportion ofWMS readings could not be statistically tested
because we lacked a false baseline to compare the C⊕ condition to.
(b) Readings, predicted responses, and estimated share of participants’ responses for each reading of “X
forgot which of his/her cards were clubs”. Due to the limited number of readings proposed for forget, this
model could not explain any difference between the I and C conditions, nor between the I⊕ and C⊕
conditions.
(c) Readings, predicted responses, and estimated share of participants’ responses for each reading of “X
was surprised by which of his/her cards were clubs”.
4.2.5 Analytical and statistical methods
The results were submitted to a reading detection analysis (which has a precursor
in Chemla and Spector 2014). We optimized models of the response data, using as
predictors the possible readings (as listed in (19) and (25)).Hence, a positive coefficient
in such a model is evidence for the availability of a particular reading (when other
plausible readings are taken into account). For each parameter (i.e., each reading), we
give the statistics obtained from model comparison as well as a confidence interval in
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Fig. 7 Percentage of ‘True’ responses for each verb and condition in Experiment 3. In a 2-by-2 comparison,
the only differences which turned out non-significant were between the C and I⊕ conditions under know
and forget, and between the I and I⊕ conditions under surprise
percent,20 which we interpret as an approximation of the proportion of responses that
can be attributed to the corresponding reading.
The fastest and slowest 2% of responses were removed. Remaining responses were
analyzed with mixed-effects logit models with random effects for participants and
items (encoded by suits). Because logit mixed models are computationally more
demanding than the linear mixed models we used in previous experiments, we often
had to drop several random effects before obtaining models such that at least the par-
simonious models derived from them would converge (Bates et al. 2015a). We tried
to fit maximal random-effects structures for participants, but only random intercepts
for items (the effects were usually very small for items).
4.3 Results
Figure 7 presents the raw responses for each condition and for each verb.21 Table 5
presents the results of the statistical analyses using readings as predictors as described
above, and the corresponding estimation of the role of each reading in terms of
explained proportion of responses for know and surprise.
We provide more detailed analyses for each of the verbs below, but we can imme-
diately summarize the results. For know, we obtain clear evidence for SE readings,
WE readings, and FBS-MS readings. The results for forget are best understood as
the mirror image of the results for know, as if the readings of forget were the exact
negations of the readings of know (more on this below). For surprise, there was clear
20 These confidence intervals were obtained by estimating confidence intervals on the logit scale, trans-
posing them by the estimated intercept, and converting back to the 0–100% scale.
21 As the figure suggests, we note that all simple two-by-two comparisons between conditions within each
verb turned out significant (χ2(1) > 5), except for the C and I⊕ conditions on know and forget items and
the I⊕ and I conditions on surprise items (all three χ2(1) < 1.3).
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evidence for the WE reading, as expected, as well as for the more controversial SE
and NE-SE readings.
4.3.1 Know
We fitted a logit mixed model on responses to know items with predictors correspond-
ing to the five readings in (19). Note that theWMS reading is true in all five conditions;
it therefore corresponded to the intercept of the model, i.e., the rate of True answers
when all predictors/other readings are false, which also happens to correspond to the
C⊕ condition. In light of this, and in the absence of a baseline for errors, we could
compute a confidence interval but no informative p-value.
The results, reported in Table 5a, indicate that all readings except the IE reading
were significantly detected. As suggested by the low rate of True responses in the C⊕
condition, the WMS reading was estimated below 6% and may still be conflated with
simple errors.
4.3.2 Forget
We ran a similar model for forget. As indicated in Table 5b, both potential readings
(WE and SE) played a significant role. Yet, looking at Fig. 7, it is clear that this model
does not provide a satisfying explanation of the results on forget items. Due to the very
limited number of readings proposed for questions embedded under forget, it cannot
explain all the differences we observed, e.g., between the I and C conditions, or
between the I⊕ and C⊕ conditions.
A simple look at the raw data in Fig. 7 shows that know and forget behaved
like a True/False mirror image of each other: responses to forget were strongly
anti-correlated to responses to know, across conditions and participants (Pearson’s
product-moment correlation: ρ = −.94, t (208) = −39, p < .001).
We ran a logit mixed model on responses to know and forget, after flipping all
responses to forget items (encoding True responses as False and vice versa, in order to
directly compare the rates of True responses to knowwith the rates of False responses to
forget). The model included Condition (5 levels), Verb (2 levels) and their interactions
as fixed effects, and random slopes for Verb per participant, but not for Condition (it
would not converge otherwise), and random intercepts for Items (suits). Overall, the
factor Verb explained very little variance (χ2(5) = 7.2, p = .20); judging from the
estimated z-values, only one interaction corresponding to theC⊕ condition approached
significance, and only did so before correction for multiple comparison (z = 2.2, p =
.03, all other z’s < .5).
4.3.3 Surprise
On responses to surprise items, we fitted a model with the 4 readings in (25) as
predictors, as well as an intercept. Given that none of the tested readings was true in
the P condition, the intercept roughly corresponded to the P condition and could be
interpreted as the baseline rate of True responses due to errors. Dropping either theWE
or the NE-WE reading had little effect on the model’s fit (both χ2(1) < 1.6, p > .2),
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yet dropping both had a very significant effect (χ2(2) = 19, p < .001). It turned
out that the two predictors were strongly correlated (estimated correlation of the fixed
effects: −.85).
Going back to the raw data, as previously mentioned, there was no significant
difference between the I⊕ and I conditions, which only differ on the NE-WE reading
(χ2(1) = .2, p = .6), but there was a major difference between the C⊕ and C
conditions, which differ on the WE and NE-WE readings (χ2(1) = 9, p = .003).
We therefore decided to drop the NE-WE reading from the model. In the second
model, reported in Table 5c, all three remaining readings were significantly detected
(all χ2(1) > 7, p < .01).
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 SE readings for all predicates
To sum up our results: First, we partially replicated Cremers and Chemla’s (2016)
results about know, in that we observed WE and SE readings. We also found a signifi-
cant proportion of FBS-MS readings (which have the no-false-belief constraint of the
IE reading without the exhaustivity). However, we did not obtain evidence of the IE
reading, which was the predominant reading found in Cremers and Chemla (2016).22
The results on forget are somehow puzzling. One might think that, provided the
presuppositions of both verbs are satisfied, the proposition-embedding forget would be
equivalent to the negation of know. If we assume the question-embedding entries to be
reducible to the proposition-embedding entries, we would predict the WE readings of
know and forget to be negations of each other (and possibly so for their SE readings).
However, this would not explain why we observe a reading of forget which seems to
be the negation of the FBS-MS reading of know (because this reading is crucially a
case of non-reducibility; see George 2011, 2013).23 The most plausible interpretation
of the result for forget, then, is a task-specific strategy, according to which participants
deal with the forget sentences by first evaluating corresponding, simpler sentences
with know and then flip their answers. Such an effect may for instance be reduced in
a between-subject design.
For surprise, we detectedWEandSE readings.We also detected theNE-SE reading,
which suggests that some participants felt that an agent could be said to be surprised
even when she did not exclude that the actual outcome was possible. Since this NE-
SE reading does not seem to correspond to the intuitive meaning of surprise, it is
22 The current task elicits more SE readings for know than Cremers and Chemla’s (2016) task. Note that
if this was due to a bias towards False answers, the chances to detect SE readings with surprise would be
reduced.
23 The only existing theories we are aware of which derive the FBS-MS reading are Theiler et al. (2016)
and Xiang (2015). However, there is a general agreement that its derivation should parallel that of the
IE reading on the exhaustive side. Yet, no theory predicts IE readings for forget. For the theories in the
exhaustification tradition (Klinedinst and Rothschild 2011; Uegaki 2015), the IE reading is the result of
a pragmatic strengthening of the WE reading and this strengthening is vacuous when applied to forget.
For alternative theories (Spector and Egré 2015; Theiler et al. 2016), the IE reading is obtained through a
different composition rule or operator, which is blocked for downward-entailing predicates.
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tempting to attribute this result to a low-level strategy again. Some possibilities come
to mind. For instance, one could try to defend the idea that participants come to accept
sentences with surprise in all conditions but N, or to treat surprise as a negation of
know with a strongly exhaustive reading. Yet another, more sophisticated possibility
is that (i) participants relied on the non-monotonic reading in (24), and (ii) in a case
of absence of expectations, they assumed that the agent had stronger expectations for
the wrong suit. This second assumption basically reduces the NE-SE to a genuine
SE reading with Uegaki’s denotation (24). Thus we might hypothesize that we found
a clear SE reading (with the standard denotation) and then maybe, on top of this,
other SE readings with a ‘not-expected’ denotation or with Uegaki’s denotation (plus
auxiliary, task-related assumptions). In the next section, we will focus on the SE
reading associated with the most standard denotation, as evidenced by the very high
proportion of True responses in the C condition, and discuss in more detail possible
alternative explanations of this important fact.
4.4.2 SE readings with surprise and alternative interpretations
We interpret the high rate of True responses in the C condition as evidence that
surprise can give rise to SE readings. This conclusion goes against a long history of
introspective judgments. An alternative view on this result has been suggested to us.24
Imagine that participants interpreted or read “Jacob was surprised by which of his
cards are clubs” as (27). It seems intuitive that the latter is true in the C condition,
which would thus explain the high rate of True responses in that condition. But if this
is correct, it would still be evidence in favor of an SE reading here, according to Beck
and Rullmann (1999), who predict the readings in (28).
(27) Jacob was surprised by how many of his cards are clubs.
(28) a. WE: Jacob expected a lower number of clubs among his cards.
b. SE: Jacob expected a different number of clubs among his cards.
Hence, even under this reinterpretation view, we obtain evidence for an SE reading
of questions embedded under surprise, albeit maybe for how-many rather than which
questions.25 In principle, we could have avoided this issue entirely by replacing cards
24 Thanks to the audience at SIASSI Berlin 2015, and in particular Angelika Kratzer, for this suggestion.
We would like to point out that the objection would apply equally to our experimental results and to the
example presented by Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011, fn. 18).
25 One may wonder whether the reading described as an SE reading in (28b) can be obtained differently,
and in particular by directly assuming an exact reading for numerals (as opposed to an at-least reading, as
in Beck and Rullmann 1999). This is in fact possible, but then we would not be able to obtain the other
reading, (28a). A strong argument for a theory that can derive the (28a) reading of how-many questions
comes from the asymmetry between (i) and (ii), already noted by Beck and Rullmann (1999). With exact
readings only, this asymmetry cannot be captured.
(i) It surprised Mary how many guests showed up.
Interpretation: It surprised her that so many guests showed up.
(ii) It surprised Mary how many eggs are sufficient to bake this cake.
Interpretation: It surprised her that so few eggs are needed.
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with entities which are well individuated. For instance, when talking about guests
sitting at a table, it may be easier to distinguish expectations regarding each individual
guest from a more general expectation regarding the total number of guests who
showed up.26
Finally, one could imagine other reinterpretations of the embedded question. The
logic behind thehow-many reinterpretationwas that in the context of a card game itmay
notmatterwhich cards are clubs, but simply howmany of each suit you got.We showed
that evenunder this reinterpretation, theTrue responseswere underlyinglySE readings,
but this may not be the case in general. We will not discuss this broader objection
because it is too vague to be rejected. Indeed, with no limit on which reinterpretations
must be considered, one can always build amodified sentence theWE reading ofwhich
corresponds to the SE reading of the original sentence (for instance, “It surprisedMary
which cards are clubs [and which are not]”).
4.5 Summary for Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we found that all verbs we tested gave rise to SE readings. While the
interpretation of the results for forget is obscured by an apparent low-level strategy of
the participants, we are confident that the results with surprise do indicate genuine SE
readings. The availability of SE readings is a challenge for many theories which are
either designed to derive the unavailability of this reading (Guerzoni and Sharvit 2007;
Romero in press) or take it as the cause for the unacceptability of whether-questions
(Nicolae 2013, 2015; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2014).
5 Conclusion
The acceptability judgments collected in Experiment 1 confirmed the soundness of the
typology proposed in the literature (in line with previous studies on the convergence
of quantitative methods and introspective judgements; Sprouse and Almeida 2013 and
Sprouse et al. 2013). Each class of verbs did indeed allow embedding of the type of
complements they were expected to allow, and there was little variation within each
class. In particular, we confirmed the widespread introspective judgment regarding the
unacceptability of whether-questions under emotive-factive predicates. However, this
unacceptability seems to be ‘soft’, in that whether-questions are not as unacceptable
under emotive-factives as they are under anti-rogative verbs (in line with Sæbø 2007).
We also found that the acceptability of an adverb of quantity followsBeck andSharvit’s
(2002) judgments on the availability of QVE, in particular with rogative predicates,
and discovered an interesting contrast between polar and alternative questions which
seems to reflect dialectal variationwithinAmerican English andmay support Guerzoni
and Sharvit’s (2014) derivation of polar questions as alternative questions.
Footnote 25 continued
Summing up, there is strong evidence for at-least readings of how-many questions. Themost straightforward
explanation for the possibility of the reading in (28b) then is that it is an SE reading (and not an independently
existing exact reading for how-many questions).
26 Thanks to Andreea Nicolae for this suggestion.
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Experiment 2 collected inferential judgments between sentences with various
responsive predicates embedding declarative complements. In this experiment, for-
get and surprise patterned together, and were judged to be more downward-entailing
than know, agree, and be happy. These results suggest that monotonicity is indepen-
dent from selectional properties, since the distinction between upward and downward
monotonicity is orthogonal to the typology confirmed in Experiment 1. All responsive
predicates were judged monotonic.
Experiment 3was a truth-value judgment task.A reading detection analysis revealed
that both know and surprise give rise to SE readings when embedding questions. The
fact that surprise does give rise to SE readings goes against most introspective judg-
ments in the literature. It also suggests that the unacceptability of whether-questions
under emotive-factives cannot be explained by the unavailability of an SE reading.
Although no theory has directly linked selectional properties of emotive-factive
predicates with their monotonicity, it has been argued that their selectional proper-
ties may be explained by the unavailability of SE readings, which in turn may be
explained by monotonicity properties. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed
that monotonicity and selectional properties vary independently, so the two connec-
tions cannot both hold. The results of Experiments 1 and 3 suggest that the broken
link is (at least) the connection between strong exhaustivity and the acceptability of
whether-questions (contra Nicolae 2013, 2015; Guerzoni and Sharvit 2014). Given
the evidence, strong exhaustivity may still be linked to monotonicity (or perceived
monotonicity; Chemla et al. 2011), however. Indeed, surprise was not judged to be
as downward-entailing as the DE controls in Experiment 2, and it may be that the
participants who had an SE reading for surprise in Experiment 3 did not access a
clearly Strawson-downward-entailing meaning for this verb.
In sum, the present studies provide a range of empirical facts about emotive-factives
and other question-embedding predicates, describing acceptable constructions, mono-
tonicity properties, and potential readings. These studies immediately contribute to
some empirical debates in the literature, in particular by providing the strongest evi-
dence to date in favor of the existence of SE readings for questions embedded under
surprise. Two broad options are available for future research on this topic; both of
these were suggested to us independently by Andreea Nicolae and Yael Sharvit. First,
following Chemla et al. (2011), it would be interesting to run all the experiments
we presented with a single set of participants, in order to test for direct correlations
between one’s acceptance of whether-questions, perceived Strawson-monotonicity,
and choice of an exhaustive reading for embedded questions. Second, it would be
interesting to investigate the distribution of NPIs under emotive-factive predicates and
see if it correlates with any of these three factors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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Appendix 1: Lists for Experiment 1
Our set of proper names consisted of 20 of themost frequent male and female names in
the U.S. We selected 28 adjectives which described appearance or physical properties
for the aliens, to avoid interaction with the activity predicates as much as possible.
Names: Alex, Anthony, Ashley, Ava, Benjamin, Chloe, Chris, Elizabeth, Emily,
Emma, Ethan, Grace, Jacob, James, John, Madison, Michael, Olivia, Sarah, William
ADJ: blue, cubical, flexible, fluffy, fuzzy, green, hollow, large, opaque, orange,
pink, purple, red, round, slender, slim, small, smooth, speckled, spherical, spiky, spiny,
spotty, stringy, striped, transparent, watery, yellow
For activity predicates, we created the 20 predicates in the pred column of Table 6.
We also used versionswith a disjunction to generate alternative questions, in the pred∨
column.
Table 6 List of pred used in Experiment 1
Pred Pred∨
Play the piano with their wings Play the piano with their wings or with their feet
Can eat 5 pounds of licorice Can eat 5 pounds or 10 pounds of licorice
Drink soda with a spoon Drink soda with a straw or with a spoon
Write poems about the moon Write poems about the moon or about the sun
Ride tall purple horses Ride purple horses or blue horses
Read 18th century books Read 18th century or 19th century books
Visit archeology museums Visit archeology museums or geology museums
Sleep with their head down Sleep with their head up or with their head down
Lay translucent eggs Lay translucent eggs or opaque eggs
Speak several African languages Speak Asian languages or African languages
Can count to two million Can count to two million or to three million
Freeze certain tropical plants Freeze or fry certain tropical plants
Talk with their noses Talk with their noses or with their ears
Hibernate every three years Hibernate every three years or twice a year
Believe in green unicorns Believe in green unicorns or blue dragons
Listen to classical music Listen to classical music or to techno music
Watch movies from the 30’s Watch movies from the 30’s or from the 40’s
Use smartphones to cook pasta Use smartphones to cook pasta or to serve wine
Drive old cars Drive old cars or rusty motorbikes
Use the Korean alphabet Use the Korean alphabet or the Greek alphabet
Appendix 2: Lists for Experiment 2
We used the same proper names as in Experiment 1. We used the same 28 adjectives,
but each was paired with another related adjective in case it would appear in one of the
control conditions (which required two different adjectives). The pairing is presented
in Table 7. The predicates used in this experiment are presented in Table 8, in their
weak (pred−), strong (pred+), and conjunctive (pred∧) versions.
123
Questions under emotive-factives
Table 7 List of adj used in
Experiment 2
Adj1 Adj2 (continued)
Blue Red Slender Slim
Cubical Spherical Slim Stringy
Flexible Rigid Small Large
Fluffy Spiky Smooth Fuzzy
Fuzzy Fluffy Speckled Slender
Green Purple Spherical Cubical
Hollow Watery Spiky Spiny
Large Small Spiny Speckled
Opaque Transparent Spotty Striped
Orange Blue Stringy Round
Pink Orange Striped Spotty
Purple Yellow Transparent Opaque
Red Green Watery Hollow
Round Flexible Yellow Pink
Table 8 List of weak, strong, and conjunctive versions of pred used in Experiment 2
Pred− Pred+ Pred∧
Burn flowers Burn roses Burned roses and tulips
Buy clothes Buy shirts Bought shirts and trousers
Color trees Color pines Colored pines and oaks
Compliment humans Compliment children Complimented children and teenagers
Destroy musical instruments Destroy violins Destroyed violins and guitars
Drink sodas Drink coke Drank coke and lemonade
Drive cars Drive Toyotas Drove Toyotas and Fords
Eat at restaurants Eat at Mexican restaurants Ate at Mexican and Chinese restaurants
Eat meat Eat pork Ate pork and beef
Kiss animals Kiss dogs Kissed dogs and cats
Play with toys Play with toy cars Played with toy cars and toy soldiers
Read books Read sci-fi novels Read sci-fi novels and love novels
Read magazines Read news magazines Read news magazines and sports
magazines
See birds See doves Saw doves and crows
Taste cookies Taste chocolate cookies Tasted chocolate cookies and caramel
cookies
Throw balls Throw tennis balls Threw tennis balls and soccer balls
Use coins Use quarters Used quarters and dimes
Use the internet Send emails Sent emails and visited websites
Visit museums Visit French museums Visited French museums and Italian
museums
Watch sports matches Watch baseball matches Watched baseball matches and football
matches
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